SPEAKING TO REMAIN SILENT: IMPLIED WAIVERS AND THE RIGHT TO SILENCE AFTER BERGHUIS by Mueller, Zachary
 SPEAKING TO REMAIN SILENT: IMPLIED 
WAIVERS AND THE RIGHT TO SILENCE AFTER 
BERGHUIS 
Zachary Mueller* 
 
 
No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself. 
 - Fifth Amendment, U.S. Constitution1 
Protecting the rights of even the least individual among us is basically the only 
excuse the government has for even existing. 
 - Ronald Reagan2 
The privilege [against self-incrimination], while sometimes “a shelter to the 
guilty,” is often “a protection to the innocent.” 
 - Murphy v. Waterfront Commission3 
It is a curious feature of our criminal justice system that suspects wishing to 
exercise their Fifth Amendment right to silence must first speak up.4 This 
requirement hardly seems intuitive given the content of the standard Miranda 
warning: “You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be 
used against you in a court of law . . . .”5 In practice, however, silence is often 
                                                           
 
* Juris Doctor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 2012. I offer my eternal gratitude to my family 
for their unconditional love and support; to my law school friends, who always fostered a good debate; 
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improved the quality of this article. 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
2 Ronald Reagan, Governor of Cal. and President of the U.S., Governor’s Speech during “Operation 
Cable Splicer” at the Governor’s Orientation (Feb. 10, 1969). 
3 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). 
4 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010). 
5 See Arizona v. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 442–46 (1966). 
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interpreted by the police as acquiescence to questioning, and suspects who remain 
silent in the belief that they are triggering their rights do so at their own peril.6 Any 
statement a suspect makes—even a one-word remark after three hours of silence—
probably constitutes a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege.7 In practice, then, 
a simple response to a police question after hours of fruitless inquiry may be 
sufficient to impose a life sentence upon the accused.8 This is, indeed, the state of 
the Supreme Court’s Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. 
The ease with which modern courts find valid waivers of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege reflects decades of post-Miranda Supreme Court decisions 
that have diminished the government’s burden in proving waiver.9 In particular, the 
creation of the implied waiver doctrine now permits courts to infer that a defendant 
waives the right to silence by engaging in a “course of conduct indicating 
waiver.”10 Since the inception of this principle, the Supreme Court’s Miranda 
jurisprudence has made invocation of the right to silence so difficult and waiver so 
easy that the burden has been effectively placed on the defendant to prove 
invocation rather than on the prosecution to prove waiver.11 For example, 
interrogators can simply begin questioning without asking suspects whether they 
                                                           
 
6 See Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2260 (noting that there is “good reason” to require the accused to invoke 
the right to silence in an unambiguous manner). The Court’s Berghuis opinion reaffirmed numerous 
lower court decisions requiring suspects to affirmatively invoke the right to silence. See, e.g., James v. 
Marshall, 322 F.3d 103, 108–09 (1st Cir. 2003) (analyzing whether the defendant invoked his right to 
silence unambiguously); Simmons v. Bowersox, 235 F.3d 1124, 1131 (8th Cir. 2001) (asking whether 
defendant made unequivocal assertion of the right to remain silent). 
7 Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2263 (concluding that the defendant’s one-word response to police after three 
hours of unsuccessful interrogation constituted a “course of conduct indicating waiver”) (quoting North 
Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979)). 
8 Pursuant to the Court’s Berghuis decision denying Thompkins’s habeas claim, Thompkins’s sentence 
of life without parole was upheld. The District Court’s opinion, including Thompkins’s initial sentence, 
is reported at Thompkins v. Berghuis, No. 05-70188, 2006 WL 3086916 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 30, 2006). 
9 See, e.g., Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574 (1987) (ruling that valid waiver does not require that 
suspects know and understand every possible consequence of waiving the privilege against self-
incrimination); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (holding that suspect may waive his rights 
even though he is unaware that a lawyer has been retained for him). 
10 Butler, 441 U.S. at 373 (1979). 
11 See generally Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 99 
MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1018 (2001) (noting that by responding to an interrogator’s questions by saying 
nothing or answering the questions, a suspect is said to have implicitly waived his rights). 
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wish to assert their rights; if suspects respond to questioning by saying nothing, 
they are presumed to have made an implied waiver.12 
This note explores the origins and purposes of the implied waiver doctrine 
and proposes a contemporary rule that attempts to strike the proper balance 
between society’s interest in obtaining valid confessions and a defendant’s interest 
in securing his constitutional rights. This analysis is divided into three parts. Part I 
addresses the framework established by the Court’s Miranda decision and post-
Miranda trends relating to custodial interrogation and waiver. Part II traces the 
growth and development of the implied waiver doctrine, with a particular emphasis 
on the types of conduct that courts have found to constitute waiver. Finally, Part III 
argues that the underlying purposes of Miranda can only be fulfilled by limiting the 
implied waiver doctrine. Specifically, implied waivers should be limited to 
circumstances in which defendants do not explicitly waive their rights but engage 
in conversation with interrogating officers immediately after the Miranda warnings 
are given. 
I. THE PURPOSE AND CONSEQUENCES OF MIRANDA 
The expressed purpose of Miranda is to provide law enforcement with 
concrete procedural guidelines to preserve the accused’s constitutional rights and to 
relieve persons taken into custody of the inherent coercive pressures of police 
interrogations.13 To this end, police must inform suspects prior to questioning that 
(1) they have the right to remain silent; (2) their statements may be used against 
them at trial; (3) they have the right to an attorney; (4) they have the right to an 
appointed attorney if they cannot otherwise afford counsel.14 
The Court chose to adopt this prophylactic rule in response to the perceived 
dangers of contemporaneous interrogation practices.15 First, the Court was 
concerned that the process of custodial interrogation presented inherent pressures to 
compel suspects to speak.16 Second, the Court worried, on an abstract level, that 
police-dominated interrogations in environments unfamiliar to the accused were 
destructive of human dignity.17 This idea supplemented the Court’s opinion that 
                                                           
 
12 Id. 
13 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442–46 (1966). 
14 Id. at 478–79. 
15 Id. at 446 (noting that, at the time, police often resorted to violence to obtain confessions). 
16 Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1522 (2008). 
17 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457. 
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coercion can be both mental and physical, and that “the blood of the accused is not 
the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition.”18 The process of interrogation 
is itself intricately designed to induce stress and anxiety, leading suspects to believe 
that the apparent hopelessness of the situation will only be alleviated by making a 
statement.19 
The Miranda Court determined that protecting the accused from the pressures 
of custodial interrogation required not only that a suspect be advised of his rights, 
but also that the prosecution overcome a heavy burden in proving that the accused 
waived his rights.20 Specifically, the government must show that an accused’s 
waiver was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.21 Moreover, the Court 
held that the accused can invoke the right to silence in any manner, at any time.22 
The government, then, faces a demanding burden in proving that the accused 
has made a valid waiver.23 In part, this heavy burden stems from the significant 
latitude given to the accused to invoke the Miranda protections at any time and in 
any manner.24 The Court’s instructions regarding the suspect’s invocation of rights 
were unusually explicit. By allowing suspects to assert their rights in any manner, 
the Court did not place any burden on the accused to demonstrate, for example, that 
invocation was unequivocal or unambiguous.25 
Given this basic framework, it was reasonable to assume that more criminal 
suspects would take advantage of Miranda after the Court’s ruling in 1966. 
Suspects would now have the benefit of being appraised of their rights upon arrest 
while also being provided with the opportunity to remain silent and secure counsel. 
Indeed, the dissent predicted that “a good many criminal defendants who otherwise 
would have been convicted . . . will now either not be tried at all or will be 
acquitted . . . .”26 In the days and months after the ruling was announced, critics 
                                                           
 
18 Id. at 448 (quoting Blackburn v. State of Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960)). 
19 Weisselberg, supra note 16, at 1537. 
20 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. 
21 Id. at 444. 
22 Id. at 445 (emphasis added). 
23 Id. at 475. 
24 Id. at 445. 
25 The court noted, for instance, that “where the assistance of counsel is a constitutional requisite, the 
right to be furnished counsel does not depend on a request.” Id. at 471 (quoting Carnley v. Cochran, 369 
U.S. 506, 513 (1962)). 
26 Id. at 542 (White, J., dissenting). 
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argued that, given the heightened requirements on law enforcement to ensure that 
suspects were aware of their rights, the decision would debilitate law enforcement 
efforts to extract confessions and secure convictions.27 
Nearly five decades later, however, the concerns of Miranda’s critics have 
never materialized.28 While social scientists and legal scholars gathered very little 
data on the effects of Miranda in the period immediately following the decision, 
more recent research suggests that nearly eighty-five percent of suspects waive 
their Miranda rights; of those, eighty percent waive their rights before police even 
begin questioning.29 The data also show that more than forty percent of suspects 
end up making an incriminating statement.30 How have the police been so 
successful in spite of Miranda? Why are suspects so willing to agree to 
questioning, especially when they are likely to give a confession that could result in 
a significant punishment? 
There are two primary explanations for the post-Miranda trends toward valid 
waivers and successful interrogations. First, law enforcement agencies at the 
national and local levels have become adept at training their officers to overcome 
the obstacles posed by Miranda.31 Even though Miranda prohibits questioners from 
inducing waivers through trickery or cajolery,32 interrogators have designed and 
adopted numerous interrogation techniques that have proven to be especially 
effective.33 For instance, interrogators often de-emphasize the significance of the 
Miranda warning by engaging the accused in small talk or insisting that the 
warning is merely a formality that can be—and should be—disregarded by the 
suspect.34 In some cases, officers lecture the suspect on the importance of telling 
                                                           
 
27 See id.; Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern Interrogation Strategies for 
Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397, 401 (1999). 
28 See generally Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical 
Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839 (showing that the overwhelming majority of 
criminal suspects waive their rights). 
29 Id. at 859. 
30 Id. at 868. 
31 See, e.g., DAVID ZULAWSKI & DOUGLAS WICKLANDER, PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF INTERVIEW AND 
INTERROGATION 23–24, 36–39 (1993) (noting the significance of the interrogator assuming the role of 
“mediator negotiator”). 
32 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966). 
33 See Leo & White, supra note 27, at 431–50 (noting the various strategies employed by interrogators to 
induce Miranda waivers). 
34 See id. at 433. 
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“his side of the story.”35 One of the most powerful tools in the interrogator’s 
arsenal is the standard practice of offering suspects benefits in exchange for a 
waiver.36 Some officers convince suspects that they can find out what charges they 
face only by first waiving their rights; in other circumstances, officers describe the 
overwhelming trove of evidence already gathered against the accused.37 Finally, 
even when suspects invoke their rights, interrogators have established methods to 
circumvent the termination of questioning. In some situations, interrogators pretend 
to misunderstand a suspect who has invoked Miranda.38 Suspects who have 
effectively exercised their Miranda rights are often encouraged to think about their 
decisions and determine whether they would like to change their minds and 
cooperate with their questioners.39 
These well-documented police practices—designed for the purpose of 
bypassing the requirements of Miranda—are important for several reasons. First, 
by prolonging interrogations after the accused has signaled a desire to exercise his 
Miranda rights, law enforcement officials explicitly violate the Miranda Court’s 
“clear” procedural requirement that the interrogation cease when the accused 
indicates that he wishes to remain silent.40 Furthermore, a defendant who 
unsuccessfully attempts to invoke his Miranda rights is likely to believe that any 
further invocation is futile because the police will persist in their effort to extract a 
confession, notwithstanding the accused’s expressed intent to end the 
interrogation.41 Finally, the continuation of questioning provides the police with 
more opportunities to obtain a confession, which, of course, has serious 
implications for the accused. In short, Miranda has not left law enforcement 
shackled and hopeless; far from the perceived world of the guilty-gone-free, 
Miranda has not significantly curtailed police efforts at obtaining confessions and 
securing convictions. 
The second explanation for post-Miranda trends in favor of valid waivers and 
successful interrogations is the proliferation of court decisions making it more 
                                                           
 
35 Id. at 435. See also DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 201 (1991). 
36 Leo & White, supra note 27, at 440. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 449. 
39 Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 189 (1998). 
40 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966). 
41 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 474–75 (1994). 
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difficult for suspects to exercise their Miranda rights.42 The waiver regime 
envisioned by Miranda’s drafters favored the accused by placing a heavy burden 
on the government to prove a knowing and voluntary waiver.43 In effect, the 
prosecution would face the same standard handed down by the Court in Johnson v. 
Zerbst, a case concerning the right to counsel: whether the accused intentionally 
relinquished or abandoned a known right or privilege.44 This test presumes that the 
accused is aware of the consequences of forgoing his rights, for it stands to reason 
that a person cannot intentionally relinquish a known right without comprehending 
the consequences of that right’s exercise or abandonment.45 The Miranda Court, 
then, established a waiver test that requires a suspect to both understand the 
substance of the right to silence and right to counsel and the consequences of 
relinquishing those rights.46 
In the years following Miranda, however, this rigid waiver system was 
gradually diluted by decisions easing the government’s burden to prove waiver. For 
instance, the Supreme Court has held that the government only needs to 
demonstrate that a suspect understood the meaning of the rights to silence and 
counsel, not the consequences of abandoning them; furthermore, a suspect can 
knowingly and voluntarily waive the Miranda privileges without being informed 
that a lawyer has been appointed to represent him.47 Police tactics aimed at 
inducing waivers have withstood Miranda’s prohibition against trickery or cajolery 
through application of a “totality of the circumstances test” to evaluate the 
voluntariness of waivers.48 This approach to voluntariness suggests that the use of 
certain prohibited police practices will not alone render a waiver invalid. Rather, in 
applying the totality framework, the court will weigh several factors: the 
                                                           
 
42 See, e.g., Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574 (1987) (ruling that valid waiver does not require that 
suspects know and understand every possible consequence of waiving the privilege against self-
incrimination); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (holding that suspect may waive his rights 
even though he is unaware that a lawyer has been retained for him); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 
157, 169 (1986) (holding that a waiver does not necessarily have to be the product of free will in order 
to be valid). 
43 North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979). 
44 See Miranda, 384 U.S. 475; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 
45 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (noting that before a defendant can waive the right 
to counsel at trial, he must be informed of the risks of self-representation). 
46 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. 
47 See Spring, 479 U.S. at 574; Moran, 475 U.S. at 421. 
48 See, e.g., Connelly, 479 U.S. at 169 (1986). 
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characteristics of the suspect, the context of the interrogation, and the overall 
conduct of the interrogators.49 Moreover, the use of “softening up” tactics and 
strategies designed to overcome a suspect’s resistance to questioning suggests that 
courts have granted interrogators significant leeway during questioning. In this 
regard, lower courts have been especially permissive; no court has held that police 
are prohibited from using persuasive techniques to induce waivers.50 
The creation of the implied waiver doctrine, however, was perhaps the most 
important post-Miranda event—the catalyst for the dissolution of the Miranda 
waiver regime.51 Once the Supreme Court ruled that a suspect may forgo his rights 
through any conduct evidencing waiver, the stage was set for a renewed assessment 
of Miranda’s foundations. 
II. IMPLIED WAIVER DOCTRINE: ORIGINS AND FALLOUT 
There is reason to believe that at the time Miranda became law, interrogators 
were prohibited from questioning suspects in the absence of a valid waiver.52 By its 
own terms, Miranda requires law enforcement officials to cease questioning when 
the accused indicates that he wishes to remain silent.53 Questioning must also end 
when a suspect requests the assistance of counsel.54 Not only does the presumption 
favor the accused, but the Miranda court repeatedly emphasized that the pressures 
inherent in custodial interrogation could only be dispelled if the accused has “a full 
opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination” by being informed 
of his rights and having the exercise of those rights honored.55 
Several decisions following Miranda, however, made it clear that police are 
free to continue questioning, even if a suspect invokes the right to silence or asks 
for an attorney. For instance, in Michigan v. Mosley, the Supreme Court upheld the 
admissibility of an incriminating statement rendered during a second interrogation 
two hours after the defendant invoked his right to remain silent.56 Noting that the 
                                                           
 
49 See, e.g., United States v. Lynch, 92 F.3d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Anderson, 929 F.2d 
96, 99 (2d Cir. 1991). 
50 Leo & White, supra note 27, at 419. 
51 See infra Part II. 
52 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473–74 (1966). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 467. 
56 See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975). 
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second line of questioning began after a significant period of time and involved a 
different crime, the Court concluded that the defendant’s rights were “scrupulously 
honored,” and thus, his inculpatory remarks relating to the first crime (made during 
the second interrogation) were admissible.57 
In practice, the “scrupulously honored” test does not vary significantly from 
the original Miranda requirement of a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver.58 
In any event, Mosley does exemplify the principle that police may persist in 
questioning even in the absence of a formal waiver or after the accused properly 
invokes Miranda. This point should not be understated. At the beginning of 
questioning, a suspect exists in a kind of no-man’s land: he has neither exercised 
nor surrendered his rights. This leaves the police with significant power to 
manipulate the situation in a way that makes successful questioning more likely. 
The creation of the implied waiver doctrine only magnifies this reality because, by 
acknowledging that suspects may waive their rights through a “course of conduct 
indicating waiver,” the Court broadened the scope of conduct that constitutes 
waiver.59 
Implied waivers find their origin in North Carolina v. Butler.60 In Butler, the 
Court upheld the validity of a confession volunteered by the defendant after he 
orally acknowledged that he understood his rights, and did not explicitly waive 
them, but agreed to cooperate with the interrogating officers.61 The defendant 
refused to sign an “Advice of Rights” form but later remarked that he would talk 
with FBI Agents.62 The Court interpreted Miranda to mean that express or oral 
statements of waiver, while “strong proof” of the validity of waiver, are not 
essential to a finding of waiver; rather any “course of conduct indicating waiver” is 
sufficient to establish that the accused has surrendered his rights.63 
Lower courts have been quick to seize on Butler’s ultimate holding. Since the 
1979 decision, every federal court of appeals has upheld the admissibility of 
                                                           
 
57 Id. 
58 Leo & White, supra note 27, at 425. 
59 The defendant in Thompkins, for example, made a one-word “yes” response to a question directed at 
him three hours after interrogation began. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2257 (2010). 
60 441 U.S. 369 (1979). 
61 Id. at 371. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 373. 
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statements falling under the category of implied waiver.64 But Butler is not the 
natural or inevitable consequence of Miranda. In particular, the Court’s opinion in 
Miranda took pains to reaffirm that waiver could never be presumed from the 
silence of the accused or from the fact that the accused eventually makes a 
confession.65 Distinguishing between situations in which the accused has engaged 
in a course of conduct indicating waiver before confessing and situations in which 
the accused has not engaged in a course of conduct indicating waiver before 
confessing is an unenviable task: it is a fact-sensitive inquiry, and no circumstance 
is singularly dispositive. 
In attempting to provide guidance on what constitutes a valid waiver of a 
suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights, courts have turned to the initial question of what 
constitutes invocation of those same rights.66 The relationship between invocation 
and waiver proves to be vital because once a suspect insufficiently invokes his 
rights, any subsequent statement might constitute an implied waiver.67 Davis v. 
United States exemplifies this point quite nicely.68 While being investigated by the 
Naval Investigative Service, the defendant, Davis, waived his Miranda rights both 
orally and in writing.69 After ninety minutes of questioning, Davis said, “Maybe I 
should talk to a lawyer.”70 When interrogating agents clarified whether Davis 
actually wanted a lawyer, Davis responded that he did not, in fact, wish to have 
                                                           
 
64 See United States v. Washington, 462 F.3d 1124, 1133–34 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Cardwell, 
433 F.3d 378, 389–90 (4th Cir. 2005); Thai v. Mapes, 412 F.3d 970, 976–77 (8th Cir. 2005); Bui v. 
DiPaolo, 170 F.3d 232, 240–41 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Gell-Iren, 146 F.3d 827, 830 (10th Cir. 
1998); United States v. Banks, 78 F.3d 1190, 1199 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Scarpa, 897 F.2d 63, 
67–69 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Manderson, 904 F.2d 78, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v. 
Gonzalez, 833 F.2d 1464, 1466 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. McKinney, 758 F.2d 1036, 1044–45 
(5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Velasquez, 626 F.2d 314, 319–20 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. 
Stark, 609 F.2d 271, 273 (6th Cir. 1979). See also Weisselberg, supra note 16, at 1582. 
65 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). See also Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 
(1962) (“Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show, or there must 
be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and 
understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver.”). 
66 See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994). 
67 See id. at 462 (explaining that the defendant did not properly invoke his right to counsel where he 
made only an ambiguous statement and that in the absence of a valid invocation, the defendant’s actions 
and words indicated his intent to waive his rights). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 455. 
70 Id. 
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counsel present.71 The agents continued questioning until Davis asked, 
unequivocally, for the assistance of an attorney.72 The Court rejected Davis’ 
argument that the agents were required to cease questioning after the first, 
ambiguous request for counsel; to the contrary, the Court held that a proper 
invocation of the right to counsel requires a suspect to make an “unambiguous or 
unequivocal” request.73 
As an initial matter, the Davis decision contradicts the Miranda Court’s 
holding that suspects may invoke their rights in any manner and at any time.74 The 
Davis decision also places on suspects the burden of exercising their rights in a 
fashion that is not immediately apparent from the Miranda warnings. The warnings 
themselves merely advise suspects that they have the right to the assistance of 
counsel;75 there is no corollary instruction regarding the limited means by which 
the accused can exercise this right. 
Even after the Davis opinion, there was reason to believe that Miranda would 
remain largely intact. By its own terms, Davis appears to govern only those cases in 
which suspects first waive their rights before attempting to invoke them.76 The 
Court in Davis confronted a situation in which a suspect effectively waived his 
Miranda rights, cooperated with police for ninety minutes, made an ambiguous 
request for an attorney, but then continued to talk with the police in the absence of 
counsel.77 The Court held that “[a]fter a knowing and voluntary waiver, law 
enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly 
requests an attorney.”78 In effect, the Court limited its decision to scenarios in 
which the suspect consents to questioning before reconsidering the prudence of 
cooperating in the absence of a lawyer. At this stage in the questioning, the accused 
has acknowledged his understanding of the right to remain silent and the right to 
                                                           
 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 459. 
74 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966). 
75 Id. at 444. 
76 Davis, 512 U.S. at 461 (“We therefore hold that, after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda 
rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests 
an attorney.”). 
77 Id. at 455. 
78 Id. at 461 (emphasis added). 
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counsel, thereby alleviating the initial pressures inherent in custodial 
interrogation.79 
Davis, moreover, concerned the right to counsel, not the right to remain 
silent.80 This distinction is critical because, unlike the right to remain silent, the 
right to counsel can only be invoked by an affirmative act; that is, a suspect must 
break silence to assert the right.81 By articulating the requirements for assertion, the 
Court was, in its own words, attempting to provide law enforcement with clear 
procedural guidelines in the conduct of custodial interrogation.82 Such a clear 
standard for assertion is not necessary for the right to remain silent, which implies 
that suspects may exercise silence by simply not speaking.83 Put another way, the 
natural meaning of “remaining silent” is to continue in a state of abstaining from 
speech.84 Nevertheless, this seemingly self-evident proposition failed to find 
recognition in the lower courts grappling with the Davis decision. 
By 2008, at least seven federal circuit courts extended Davis’ “unambiguous 
statement” standard to the initial waiver stage.85 Some circuits also applied Davis 
to the initial question of whether a suspect properly invoked the right to remain 
silent.86 Although the Court in Davis clarified that suspects need not speak with the 
                                                           
 
79 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468 (explaining the inherent pressures of custodial interrogations). 
80 See Davis, 512 U.S. at 454. 
81 See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2276 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Advising a 
suspect that he has a ‘right to remain silent’ is unlikely to convey that he must speak . . . to ensure the 
right will be protected. . . . By contrast, telling a suspect ‘he has the right to the presence of an 
attorney[’] . . . implies the need for speech to exercise that right.”). 
82 See Davis, 512 U.S. at 458–59. See also McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991) (“[Miranda] 
requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire 
for the assistance of an attorney. . . .”). 
83 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1416 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “silence” as “restraint from speaking”). 
84 THE OXFORD AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1276 (2002). 
85 Weisselberg, supra note 16, at 1579. See United States v. Johnson, 400 F.3d 187 (4th Cir. 2005); 
United States v. Lee, 413 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141 (11th Cir. 
2004); James v. Marshall, 322 F.3d 103 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v. Brown, 287 F.3d 965 (10th Cir. 
2002); United States v. Syslo, 303 F.3d 860 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Suarez, 263 F.3d 468 (6th 
Cir. 2001). 
86 Weisselberg, supra note 16, at 1580. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 79 F.3d 298, 305 (2d Cir. 
1996) (assuming arguendo that a “parallel standard” to Davis applies to the right to remain silent). 
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precision of an “Oxford don,”87 lower courts have struggled to distinguish between 
the ambiguous and the unequivocal.88 
The uncertainty brewing in the lower courts concerning the interrelationship 
of invocation and waiver and the proper application of Davis reached a boiling 
point in Berghuis v. Thompkins.89 The defendant in Berghuis was arrested in 
connection with a murder that occurred in Southfield, Michigan.90 During 
questioning, the suspect signed an advice-of-rights form, but remained generally 
uncommunicative91 and, in the officer’s words, “largely silent.”92 After three hours 
of unsuccessful questioning, the interrogating officer made one final attempt to 
elicit a response by asking a series of questions concerning the suspect’s religious 
beliefs, culminating in, “Do you pray to God to forgive you for shooting that boy 
down?”93 The suspect’s “yes” response was offered as evidence at his trial, which 
resulted in a conviction.94 
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the Davis “unambiguous 
request” standard applies to the right to remain silent (that is, the suspect must 
unambiguously request to remain silent) and that Thompkins’ “yes” response to the 
officer’s question constituted a course of conduct indicating waiver.95 Berghuis 
clearly exemplifies the suspect’s dilemma: even if Thompkins believed that he was 
exercising his right to silence by remaining silent for the first three hours of 
interrogation, his one-word response to the officer’s question amounted to a 
waiver, which ultimately resulted in his conviction. Berghuis shows that an 
insufficient invocation often yields a valid waiver. 
                                                           
 
87 Davis, 512 U.S. at 459. 
88 See People v. Stitely, 108 P.3d 182, 195 (Cal. 2005) (ruling that “I think it’s time for me to stop 
talking” is ambiguous); State v. Henness, 679 N.E.2d 686, 695 (Ohio 1997) (concluding that “I think I 
need a lawyer because if I tell everything I know, how do I know I’m not going to wind up with a 
complicity charge?” is not a valid invocation). 
89 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010). 
90 Id. at 2256. 
91 Id. at 2266. 
92 Id. at 2256. 
93 Id. at 2257. 
94 Id. at 2258. 
95 Id. at 2259–63. 
U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  P I T T S B U R G H  L A W  R E V I E W  
 
P A G E  |  6 0 0  |  V O L U M E  7 3  ( 2 0 1 2 )   
 
As the dissent in Berghuis noted, the plain language of Miranda contradicts 
the Berghuis majority’s holding.96 First, the Court in Miranda observed: 
The fact of lengthy interrogation . . . before a statement is taken is strong 
evidence that the accused did not validly waive his rights. In these circumstances 
the fact that the individual eventually made a statement is consistent with the 
conclusion that the compelling influence of the interrogation finally forced him 
to do so. It is inconsistent with any notion of a voluntary relinquishment of the 
privilege.97 
Furthermore, waiver may not be presumed simply from the fact that the police 
obtain a confession.98 Finally, “mere silence” in response to questioning is 
insufficient to establish waiver because a suspect’s silence does not provide 
adequate assurances that he has “intelligently and understandingly” rejected the 
offer to exercise his rights.99 But the most glaring contradiction is the majority’s 
conclusion that Thompkins’ incriminating statement—his “yes” response—
amounted to a “course of conduct indicating waiver,” despite Miranda’s warning 
that inculpatory statements alone are insufficient to establish waiver.100 A finding 
that Thompkins had not in fact waived his rights would have precluded the 
necessity of analyzing whether he invoked his right to silence, relieving the Court 
of the difficult question regarding Davis’ applicability.101 
The Berghuis Court’s novel application of the implied waiver doctrine leaves 
criminal suspects in a tough position: as long as they understand the substance of 
the Miranda warning, any uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver, even 
if the only statement a suspect makes is an inculpatory one.102 In effect, the Court 
has endorsed a jurisprudence of confession-as-waiver. 
                                                           
 
96 Id. at 2268 (Sotomayer, J., dissenting). 
97 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966). 
98 Id. at 475. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. See also Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2270 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
101 Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2273 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
102 Id. at 2262 (Sotomayer, J., dissenting). 
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III. MOVING FORWARD AFTER BERGHUIS: LIMITING IMPLIED 
WAIVERS AND CLARIFYING THE MIRANDA WARNING 
To ensure that the constitutional rights of criminal suspects remain as strongly 
protected today as they were in the immediate aftermath of Miranda, the post-
Berghuis implied waiver doctrine should be limited in scope, and suspects should 
be advised of the proper method of invoking their rights. 
Under the original Miranda framework, waiver was only effective if 
“specifically made” by the accused.103 The exception recognized in Butler for 
waivers implied from the totality of the circumstances is narrow in scope to ensure 
that the original principles of Miranda continue to protect criminal suspects.104 
Butler addresses the particular situation in which the accused who refuses to 
formally waive his rights nevertheless cooperates with the interrogators 
immediately after questioning begins, signaling a willingness to comply with the 
officer’s request for a statement.105 It is from the accused’s affirmative compliance 
from the onset of interrogation that waiver is inferred. Thus, despite recognizing a 
narrow exception to the Miranda rule, the Butler Court reaffirmed Miranda’s 
original observation that “the fact of lengthy interrogation or incommunicado 
incarceration before a statement is made is strong evidence that the accused did not 
validly waive his rights.”106 
In short, faithful application of Miranda is best achieved by applying the 
implied waiver exception only to those cases in which the accused cooperates from 
the beginning of questioning. This “initial compliance” reading of Butler vindicates 
Miranda’s conclusion that the police-dominated interrogation setting works very 
quickly to compel the accused to speak.107 As discussed earlier, police have 
become especially proficient at employing techniques of persuasion, which are 
intended to undermine the defendant’s will.108 
                                                           
 
103 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470. 
104 North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979) (noting that a heavy burden rests on the 
government to establish waiver and that the courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his 
rights). 
105 Id. at 371. 
106 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476. 
107 Id. at 461. 
108 See generally ZULAWSKI & WICKLANDER, supra note 31; Leo & White, supra note 27. 
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The initial-compliance application of Butler is not without precedent. In cases 
where the lower courts have found implied waivers, one common theme emerges: 
the accused demonstrated some commitment to speak with the interrogators from 
the commencement of questioning.109 For instance, lower courts have found 
implied waivers where the accused immediately responded to questions in the hope 
of revealing her insignificant role in the crime,110 where the accused agreed in 
writing to proceed without counsel before admitting that a photograph shown to 
him by the police contained his picture,111 and where the accused failed to invoke 
the right to silence by verbally refusing to identify himself and, shortly thereafter, 
confessing.112 In each of these cases, the defendant indicated some willingness at 
the outset to actively participate in the interrogation. 
Finally, the initial compliance test ensures that waiver will never be presumed 
from the silence of the accused or from the fact that a confession is eventually 
obtained.113 The Berghuis case is illustrative in this regard. The defendant in 
Berghuis never indicated, in any manner, that he wished to cooperate or converse 
with the police; rather he sat nearly silent for almost three hours before making a 
one-word response to a spiritual inquiry.114 By establishing an all-encompassing 
implied waiver regime (in ruling that a one-word response after three hours of 
silence is a course of conduct indicating waiver), the Berghuis Court approved the 
elimination of Miranda’s presumption against finding waiver from the accused’s 
confession.115 This ruling contradicted numerous lower court decisions requiring 
waiver to be proven by something more than an inculpatory statement.116 By 
                                                           
 
109 See generally United States v. Nichols, 512 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 2008), abrogated on other grounds by 
United States v. Buford, 632 F.3d 264 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Washington, 462 F.3d 1124 (9th 
Cir. 2006); United States v. Velasquez, 626 F.2d 314 (3d Cir. 1980). 
110 Velasquez, 626 F.2d at 320. 
111 Washington, 462 F.3d at 1134. 
112 See Nichols, 512 F.3d at 798. 
113 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). 
114 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2256–57 (2010). 
115 Id. at 2270 (Sotomayer, J., dissenting). 
116 See United States v. Smith, 218 F.3d 777, 781 (7th Cir. 2000) (acknowledging implied waiver where 
the accused “immediately . . . talk[ed] to the agents after refusing to sign a waiver form”); Bui v. 
DiPaolo, 170 F.3d 232, 240 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding implied waiver where the defendant engaged in a 
steady stream of speech with the police); United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1475 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(refusing to recognize an implied waiver where the suspect remained silent for ten minutes before 
responding to questions). 
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requiring the government to demonstrate that the accused has manifested some 
consent to participating in questioning, the initial compliance standard ensures that 
any incriminating statement is the product of the accused’s free will, which is the 
hallmark of the Miranda waiver system.117 
In addition to confining the application of the implied waiver doctrine, 
suspects taken into custody should be advised that if they wish to exercise their 
right to remain silent, they must make an “unambiguous request”118 to do so. This 
addition to the standard Miranda warning incorporates the Court’s determination in 
Berghuis that the Davis unambiguous-request standard applies to the right to 
remain silent, even though Davis—on its face—only governs post-waiver 
invocations of the right to counsel.119 
There are two primary reasons to incorporate the “unambiguous” language 
into the familiar Miranda warnings. First, it ensures that criminal suspects are 
aware of the proper method for exercising their constitutional rights, in the same 
way that the standard Miranda warnings ensure that suspects are aware of their 
rights.120 Second, because there is great uncertainty in the lower courts about what 
constitutes an unambiguous statement or assertion,121 it is essential that the accused 
is advised of the need to be explicit, particular, and definite. Statements containing 
modifiers or hedges are especially likely to be insufficient under Davis.122 Indeed, 
as previously noted, when a suspect makes an ambiguous request that he believes 
to be an assertion of his rights, the interrogator’s refusal to end questioning may 
                                                           
 
117 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 536 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that it is the free will of the defendant 
that is implicated by the prohibition against compulsive interrogation). 
118 Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2260. 
119 See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461 (1994) (“[A]fter a knowing and voluntary waiver . . . 
law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an 
attorney.”). 
120 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (“[Government must adopt] fully effective means . . . to inform 
accused persons of their right to remain silent and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it.”). 
121 See, e.g., People v. Stitely, 108 P.3d 182, 196 (Cal. 2005) (holding that suspect’s statement, “I think 
it’s about time for me to stop talking,” is not unambiguous); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (ruling that “I think I would like to talk to a lawyer” is not unambiguous), overruled on other 
grounds by Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003); United States v. Mills, 122 F.3d 346, 347 (7th Cir. 
1997) (incorporating the facts as originally articulated in United States v. Banks, 78 F.3d 1190 (7th Cir. 
1996), and concluding that “Get the f—out of my face. I don’t have nothing to say.” is not a valid 
invocation). 
122 See Marcy Strauss, Understanding Davis v. United States, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1011, 1040–43 
(2007) (describing how courts have found that phrases with hedges and modifiers are ambiguous). 
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lead the suspect to believe that further objection is pointless.123 Interestingly, the 
Davis Court, which held that defendants must assert the right to counsel in an 
unambiguous manner, nevertheless acknowledged: 
When a suspect understands his (expressed) wishes to have been ignored (and by 
hypothesis, he has said something that an objective listener could “reasonably,” 
although not necessarily, take to be a request), in contravention of the “rights” 
just read to him by his interrogator, he may well see further objection as futile 
and confession (true or not) as the only way to end his interrogation.124 
In assessing how the extension of Davis may affect invocation of the right to 
remain silent, Professor Marcy Strauss has identified eights types of statements 
often interpreted by the courts as ambiguous despite a suspect’s intent to invoke the 
right: 
(1) questions concerning the right; (2) use of modal verbs like “maybe,” 
“might,” or “could;” (3) hedges; (4) simple silence; (5) requests to do something 
else besides talking; (6) temporally vague comments about the willingness to 
talk; (7) comments that indicate a desire not to talk about specific topics or not to 
say something incriminating; (8) comments that become ambiguous because of 
other statements or conduct.125 
Because locating the distinction between clear and ambiguous statements requires a 
subjective inquiry,126 suspects should be placed on notice that they must invoke 
their rights with particularity. 
Incorporation of the required means to exercise the right to silence into the 
Miranda warning also reflects practical concerns. It is exceedingly unlikely that the 
Court will soon reverse itself on the extension of Davis to the right to remain 
silent.127 Because a suspect is unlikely to understand that he must first speak in 
                                                           
 
123 Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2278 (Sotomayer, J., dissenting). 
124 Davis, 512 U.S. at 472–73. 
125 See generally Marcy Strauss, The Sounds of Silence: Reconsidering the Invocation of the Right to 
Remain Silent Under Miranda, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 773, 788–802 (2009). 
126 Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2277 (Sotomayer, J., dissenting). 
127 See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 534 (2007) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (“The Court (and, I think, the country) loses when important precedent is overruled without 
good reason . . . .”). 
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order to remain silent,128 an enhanced Miranda warning guards against the 
possibility that a suspect will unwillingly waive his rights after trying futilely to 
assert them.129 
IV. CONCLUSION 
If the purpose of Miranda is to provide law enforcement with clear procedural 
guidelines in the conduct of custodial interrogation, while alleviating suspects of 
the inherent pressures of police questioning,130 then it must be considered why, 
after forty-five years, the procedural guidelines are not quite clear at all and the 
inherent pressures of police questioning have been replaced by new pressures on 
suspects to invoke their rights in a narrowly-circumscribed manner. How far can 
police go in extracting confessions? If three hours of persistent questioning is 
constitutionally permissible,131 is six or eight or eighteen hours? Which statements 
of invocation by a suspect are sufficiently unambiguous? Can police continue 
questioning even when suspects make unequivocal requests to exercise their rights? 
Perhaps the most provocative question after Berghuis is this: absent an 
unequivocal assertion of the right to silence, is there anything a suspect can say or 
do that does not amount to a course of conduct indicating waiver? If an 
incriminating, one-word response after three hours of silence signals a suspect’s 
willingness to surrender the right, what words or actions by the accused will not 
amount to an implied waiver? 
These are the questions that the lower courts now face. In the meantime, 
thousands of interrogations will now be governed by a new set of rules that leave 
suspects uninformed about the proper method of exercising their rights, while 
providing law enforcement with incentives to persist in questioning in the hope that 
any slight response from the accused will be deemed an implied waiver. The 
consequences could not be more real or severe: Berghuis now sits in a jail cell for 
the remainder of his life, in large part because he once said “yes.” If the right to 
remain silent does not actually permit one to remain silent, then we all have a right 
to know about it. 
                                                           
 
128 Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2276 (Sotomayer, J., dissenting). 
129 See id. at 2278. 
130 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442–46 (1966). 
131 See Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2257. 
